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Abstract 
As suggested by human capital theory, workers with flexible contracts participate less often in training 
than those with permanent contracts. We find that this is merely due to the fact that flexworkers receive 
less employer–funded training, a gap they can only partly compensate for by their own training 
investments. Flexworkers particularly participate less in firm–specific training that is meant to keep up 
with new skill demands than workers with permanent contracts. However, for those who participate in 
employer–funded firm–specific training, a temporary contract appears to facilitate the transition to a 
permanent contract with the same employer. However, this does not hold for participation in self–paid 
training. This training, which is usually general training, does not help in finding a better job. 
 
JEL–codes: J24, J41, J62 
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1 Introduction 
In 2010, about one out of ten Dutch worker had a flexible contract. Flexible labour contracts enable firms 
to adjust employment to a fast–changing environment, as in a sudden collapse in product demand. The 
recent economic crisis clearly showed how firms that were heavily affected by the unexpected fall in 
product and service demand directly disposed of their workforce with temporary contracts and those 
employed via temporary work agencies (Glassner and Galgóczi 2009). At the same time, the continuous 
shifts in skills demanded in the labour market also require that workers participate in training courses that 
update their skills (Allen and De Grip 2012). When workers with temporary contracts play a major role in 
the adjustment process in the labour market, particularly these workers should be able to adjust their skills 
to the shifts in the skill demands. 
 
This paper investigates the extent to which the participation in training among flexworkers is similar to 
that of workers with permanent contracts, and to what extent differences in training participation are 
associated with differences in mobility in the internal or external labour market. While most studies in the 
field compare temporary workers to permanent workers (Booth et al. 2002), we are able to distinguish 
between four different kinds of contract arrangements: permanent contracts, temporary contracts, 
temporary work agency contracts, and on–call contracts. Moreover, we are able to distinguish between 
employer–funded training and self–funded training, whereas most studies only focus on employer–funded 
training (Albert et al. 2005). This enables us to analyze whether flexworkers could compensate a lack of 
employer–funded training by their own investments in training. Finally, we are able to distinguish 
between general training which increases a worker’s opportunities for another job, and firm–specific 
training which focuses on the skills needs in the current job. 
 
Human capital theory predicts that firms will not invest in training for employees who are likely to leave 
the firm soon, because the period in which they can reap the benefits of such investments is short 
(Bassanini et al. 2007).1 When this is the case, the future employability of flexworkers would be at risk 
when they face skills obsolescence at some stage in their working life. This risk is particularly large when 
there is a low transition probability of employees with flexible labour contracts to permanent employment. 
This would mean that flexworkers are ‘trapped’ in this type of contract due to low levels of human capital 
investment (Dekker 2007). However, this will not be a problem if flexible workers compensate for the 
lack of employer–funded training through their own human capital investments, or when flexible workers 
can make a transition to permanent employment in which workers can catch up in the development of 
their skills. 
 
                                                          
1 Economic literature suggests the existence of a possible trade–off between temporary contracts and investments in 
human capital (Arulampalam and Booth 1998). 
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There are few institutional restrictions on the use of fixed–term contracts in the Netherlands, and 
employment protection for temporary employment is far less strict than for permanent employment 
(OECD 2004). Until 1999, when the Flexibility and Security Act was put into place, employers could 
renew temporary contracts only once. Since that date, employers can renew temporary contracts up to 
three times, although for a limited contract period. There are also few institutional arrangements for the 
training of flexworkers. Human capital investments for temporary work agency workers are facilitated 
through the Sector Fund for Education and Development of Temporary Work Agencies (STOOF). 
STOOF was set up in 2003 to advise, stimulate, and co–finance training activities in temporary work 
agencies. The training fund available through STOOF is created by a levy of employees’ wages. 
 
Our analyses are based on large representative data for the Dutch workforce: the panel data of the Labour 
Force Survey. A distinguishing feature is that we use the longitudinal feature of this data to study 
employment mobility patterns of workers with different kind of contracts. The data does not allow us to 
instrument the training participation decision.2 Our analyses therefore document, albeit in a detailed way, 
the correlations between various types of contract (permanent contracts, temporary contracts, temporary 
work agency contracts, and on–call contracts), various types of training investments (no training, 
employer–funded or self–funded training), and various mobility patterns (remaining on a flex contract 
with the same employer, transition to a permanent contract with the same employer, a flex contract with 
another employer, a transition to a permanent contract with another employer, and losing employment).  
 
We show that workers with flexible contracts participate less often in employer–funded training than 
those with permanent contracts, and that flexworkers can only partly compensate for this gap by their own 
training investments. Especially those who work on temporary contracts lag behind in terms of employer–
funded training. Flexworkers invest most in their own training but these investments do not fully bridge 
the training–participation gap. The lower training participation of flexworkers suggests that their 
adaptability to changing skill demands in the labour market is likely to lag behind compared to that of 
workers with a permanent job. Therefore, workers with flexible contracts may be stuck in these flexible 
jobs all through their working lifes and will experience difficulties remaining employed when skill 
demands in the labour market change. However, this does not hold for workers with flexible contracts 
whose participation in employer–funded firm–specific training helps in making a transition towards a 
permanent contract with a firm whose training participation is part of the selection process in the 
temporary jobs they offer new employees (Autor 2001). However, those who do not participate in 
employer–funded firm–specific training cannot adequately compensate for this difference by investing in 
                                                          
2 In particular, the data do not allow for the estimation of fixed–effects models. Moreover, the data do not include 
exogeneous variables that could be used to instrument the training participation decision.  
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self–funded training (mostly with a general character), since we show that the latter does not help in 
finding a better job. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a brief overview of the Dutch institutional context and 
the theoretical background on the relation between flexible labour contracts and human capital 
investments. The data used is presented in Section 3. Section 4 analyses the relation between different 
kinds of labour contracts and workers’ training participation. The analyses focus on the probability to 
engage in employer–funded or self–funded training, as well as on the question whether the training is 
general or firm–specific. In Section 5, we analyse the relation between the training participation of 
flexworkers and their future labour market position. Section 6 summarizes our main findings and 
concludes. 
 
2 Theoretical background and prior research 
 
2.1 Theoretical background 
Within labour economics, investments in workers’ skills are the backbone of human capital theory. The 
central principle of human capital theory is that the knowledge and skills acquired in training represent 
human capital, which is valued by employers because it leads to higher productivity (Becker 1975). 
Employers will invest in the training of their workers if the expected rate of return from the investment in 
training is higher than the rate of return on alternative investments with a similar risk (as represented by 
the market interest rate). Of course, the expected rate of return on training for the firm is dependent on 
training costs and benefits. The firm will be able to appropriate some of the benefits of training as long as 
the higher productivity of its workers is not completely offset by higher wages. According to human 
capital theory, employees’ motivations to invest in their own human capital do not differ fundamentally 
from employers’ motivations. Employees benefit from training if it leads to higher wages. How the 
training benefits are shared between the firm and the employees depends on both the firm specificity of 
the training and the investment horizon, that is, the time window in which the benefits of training can be 
reaped. 
 
Human capital literature in particular focuses on the differences between general and firm–specific 
training to emphasize the differences between training that raises the productivity of workers in all firms, 
and training that only increases workers’ productivity in the firm that is providing the training. Since 
firm–specific training is of no or only limited value to other firms, it will not increase employees’ market 
wages, allowing firms to pay their employees less than the value of their productivity. General training, 
however, is also valuable for other firms and will thus lead to an increase in employees’ market wages, 
limiting the firm’s possibilities of appropriating the benefits from training.  
 
   
5 
 
Becker’s (1975) argument that firms only benefit from firm–specific training was later modified by 
various studies, such as Katz and Ziderman (1990), Stevens (1994), Booth and Chatterji (1995), Booth 
and Snower (1996), Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), and Lazear (2009). These studies focus on three 
related arguments. Firstly, several studies argue that training enables firms to acquire private information 
on employees’ skills and abilities (e.g., Katz and Ziderman 1990, Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). Secondly, 
some studies focus on labour market imperfections that give firms some market power in setting wages. 
Stevens (1994) argues that when training is transferable between firms with market power in setting 
wages, the potential benefits from training are not only for the firm providing the training and the 
employee who has been trained, but also for other firms that can poach the trained employees. In addition, 
since the poachers acquire some of the benefits from training, there is no way for the employee 
demanding the training or the firm supplying it to capture all the rewards from this training. Inevitably, 
this leads to an underinvestment in training, particularly for employees with flexible contracts, since these 
contracts reflect a lack of mutual commitment between the firm and employee. Thirdly, and more 
recently, Lazear (2009) showed that training cannot simply be decomposed into general and specific 
components, since all firms require a firm–specific mix of different kinds of general skills. This skill–
weights approach claims that therefore all training is part of employees’ firm–specific human capital. 
 
Actually, for both employees and employers, the investment horizon is particularly important in 
determining the amount of training investments, as well as the sharing of the costs. For a given level of 
training costs and training benefits per period, the shorter the expected investment horizon, the lower the 
rate of return on the investment will be. For firms, the investment horizon equals the expected time 
employees will remain within the organization. For employees, the investment horizon is closely related 
to the specificity of the training. If the training is firm specific, the investment horizon is the length of 
time employees expect to stay with the firm. If the training is general, the investment horizon is the time 
they expect to remain on the labour market. Employers will therefore be less likely to train employees 
with temporary contracts, since they do not intend to continue relations with these employees for long. 
Moreover, they will perceive a higher risk that these employees will leave the firm relatively soon. For 
employees, the willingness to invest in training depends only on the type of contract if the training is firm 
specific. Crawford (1988, 1990) analysed training investments in the more general context of relation–
specific capital productivity, that is, human capital whose productivity depends on the continuation of the 
relation. Crawford argued that if there is no long–term contract to commit to future compensation for sunk 
costs of training investments, the firm and the worker will agree to underinvest. Temporary contracts will 
therefore lead to a lower participation in training than permanent contracts. 
 
2.2 Prior research 
Several studies show that training participation of workers with temporary contracts is significantly lower 
than that of workers with permanent contracts (e.g., Booth et al. 2002, Forrier and Sels 2003, Almeida–
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Santos and Mumford 2004, Albert et al. 2005). Booth et al. (2002) found that, in the UK, work–related 
training is 12% lower for male employees on fixed–term contracts and 20% lower for those on seasonal–
casual contracts compared to male employees with a permanent contract. Female employees on fixed–
term contracts have a 7% lower probability of being trained than permanent employees, while those with a 
seasonal–casual contract have a 15% lower probability to participate in a training course. Using matched 
employer–employee data for the UK, Murphy et al. (2008) showed that employees on temporary contracts 
are 6–9% less likely to participate in training compared to employees on permanent contracts. In their 
study on the Australian labour market, Draca and Green (2004) also found that employees in flexible 
employment face a substantially lower probability of receiving employer–funded training. The authors 
found that these differences are even more marked for training intensity, as indicated by the duration of 
the training and the number of courses in which workers participate. For the Netherlands, Jonker and De 
Grip (1999) also found that employees with temporary contracts receive half as much training as 
employees with permanent contracts, although they do not find that the duration of the training is shorter. 
More recently, De Graaf–Zijl et al. (2010) reported a significant 12% difference in the participation of 
employer–paid training between employees with a temporary contract and those with a regular job. 
 
Concerning the labour mobility prospects of flexworkers, Booth et al. (2002) examined whether 
temporary jobs in the UK are ‘dead end’ jobs with poor pay and prospects or ‘stepping stones’ to 
permanent employment. The authors found that fixed–term contracts are effective stepping stones to 
permanent work, but this does not hold for casual–seasonal employment. Dekker (2007) found 
comparative evidence for the UK, Germany, and the Netherlands and concluded that, although mobility to 
permanent employment is low, flexible employment acts as a stepping stone to standard employment.  
 
Another strand of literature considers the transition probabilities from unemployment to employment for 
persons who had a temporary job before they became unemployed. Arranz et al. (2010), for example, 
showed that temporary workers who became unemployed at the end of their temporary contract are more 
likely to exit unemployment through another temporary contract than through permanent employment. In 
the same vein De Graaf–Zijl et al. (2010) found that although previous employment in a temporary job 
shortens unemployment spells, temporary workers do not have better prospects for finding a permanent 
job in the years after their unemployment. However, these studies do not consider whether this mobility 
pattern is related to training participation.  
 
Loewenstein and Spletzer (1997) found that training often takes place after a few years of job tenure. 
They argue that employers may be reluctant to invest in the training of employees until they have more 
evidence on the quality of the worker–firm match. This suggests that firms will also not invest in the 
training of employees who are in a temporary job, which is meant to be a selection period for permanent 
employment at the firm. However, Autor (2001) found that temporary work agencies do invest in the 
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training of their employees. Building on the studies of Katz and Ziderman (1990) and Acemoglu and 
Pischke (1998), Autor argued that temporary work agencies provide up–front training during unpaid hours 
prior to offering a permanent contract. This is because, in addition to developing human capital, this 
training serves two complementary functions. First, the opportunity to be trained induces self–selection, 
enabling the agency to recruit employees with valuable unobserved ability (see also Barron et al. 1989). 
Second, it facilitates employee screening by generating private information on the skills and abilities of 
employees. The key premise of Autor’s model is that training is more productive for high–ability 
employees. The implication of this positive selection is that temporary work agencies not only provide 
flexible spot market labour to other firms, but also information on employee quality. 
 
3 Data and empirical approach 
We make use of the Dutch Labour Force Survey (LFS) for the years 2004–2008. This survey is a rotating 
panel survey among 65,000 households a year. Within each household, all persons aged 15 or older are 
interviewed, but we focus our analyses on working individuals of the age 15–64. Households are followed 
during one year on a quarterly basis. After the first face–to–face interview, households are contacted four 
more times by telephone. The period between two interviews is about three months. Because of the panel 
character of the survey, the LFS is very suitable for the analysis of labour market dynamics (Bierings et al. 
2009, Kerkhofs et al. 2009). The LFS contains detailed information on the type of contract, training 
participation, and the occupational background of employees, as well as firm characteristics.  
 
We distinguish between four different types of contract arrangements: permanent employment, temporary 
work agency employment, on–call employment, and temporary contracts. Permanent employment refers 
to contracts with a fixed number of hours and a contract duration that is not determined. Other types of 
employment are defined as flexible contracts, and information on the terms of employment is used to 
define the type of flexible contract: temporary work agency contracts, on–call contracts (contracts without 
a fixed number of working hours), and temporary contracts (contracts with a duration of less than two 
years).3 In this study we exclude students, the self–employed and workers who are working for fewer than 
12 hours a week.4 
 
The information on training pertains to the training the respondent followed at the time of the first 
interview or, up to four weeks before the first interview.5 As a consequence, training participation in short 
                                                          
3 Workers on a temporary contract that, after a probationary period, will be converted to a permanent contract are 
classified as permanent workers.  
4 This means that individuals with on–call contracts who are not currently working or working for fewer than 12 hours 
a week have been left out of the analyses. 
5 In case a respondent participated in more than one training event, he is asked to report on the most important one 
from the perspective of his current occupation. 
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training courses is probably underestimated. The LFS also contains information on who paid for the costs 
of training. We define employer–funded training as training for which the employer paid the costs of 
training either in full or in part. Self–funded training pertains to training that was fully paid for by the 
employee herself.6 Our data allow us to look into the reason why workers participate in training: (1) to 
keep up with new skills demands, (2) because it is compulsory, (3) in order to make a promotion, (4) to 
improves the chances for another job, and (5) non–work related reasons. Although the distinction between 
general and firm–specific training is a rather crude one (Lazear 2009), we assume that the first three 
motives pertain to firm–specific training, while the last two motives refer to general training.  
 
We perform multivariate analyses for the probability of participating in training, and the type of training 
(employer–funded versus self–funded, and general versus firm–specific training). These analyses focus on 
the relation between the contract type and the training probability, and control for a large set of individual, 
job and firm characteristics as well as external conditions: gender, age and age squared, ethnicity, 
educational level, occupation, part–time work, job tenure (in log), industry sector, as well as region and 
time dummies. Summary statistics of all these variables are reported in the Appendix (Table A.1). From 
human–capital theory, we expect that flexworkers participate significantly less often in training than 
workers with permanent contracts. In particular, we expect that this is particularly due to a lower 
participation in employer–funded training as employers who fund most training costs have less incentives 
to invest in the human capital of their flexible workforce than in the workers with permanent contracts. 
 
Mobility is measured by comparing the employment situation at the time of the fifth interview with that at 
the first interview one year earlier. Respondents are asked whether they are still with the same employer 
and whether they still have the same type of work arrangement. This allows us to distinguish among five 
possible labour mobility patterns for flexible workers: (1) remaining on a flex contract with the same 
employer, (2) transition to a permanent contract with the same employer, (3) transition to a flex contract 
with another employer, (4) transition to a permanent contract with another employer, and (5) losing 
employment (i.e. making a transition to unemployment or inactivity). 
 
We analyse the relation between labour market mobility, type of contract and training participation by 
estimating a multinomial logit model for the probability of experiencing the various types of mobility. 
This analysis controls for the same set of variables as those included in the training participation models. 
From human–capital theory, we expect flexworkers who received employer–funded training, especially 
when this training is firm–specific, to remain with their employer because the employer is willing to reap 
                                                          
6 No more than 2% of all training is neither financed by the employer nor the employee. These cases are included in 
our analyses for total training participation. When we distinguish between employer–funded and self–funded training 
(e.g. Table 3 and following), these cases are excluded. 
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the benefits from its investment (Autor 2001). Previous empirical studies, however, have shown that the 
relation between training participation and mobility on the external job market is ambiguous. Lynch 
(1993) and Parent (1999), for example, showed that workers who participate in employer–funded training 
are indeed less likely to switch employer, but Goux and Maurin (2000) and Bassanini et al. (2005) found 
that there is no significant difference in external labour mobility between workers who did and those who 
did not participate in any employer–funded training. Furthermore, we expect self–funded training to be 
related to transitions to a permanent contract with another employer since flexworkers will particularly 
pay for their own training when they expect favourable external labour market opportunities. 
 
4 Training participation of flexworkers 
Table 1 shows the training participation by contract type. As expected, employees with permanent 
contracts participate more often in training than workers with flexible work arrangements. This confirms 
earlier findings by Booth et al. (2002) for the UK. In 2004–2008, the training participation rate of workers 
with a permanent contract was 11.5%, whereas only 9.5% of workers with a flexible work contract 
participated in training. There are considerable differences, however, between different types of flexible 
work arrangements. Training participation is particularly low among workers on on–call contracts.  
 
The greater part of the training is funded by the employer (see also Pischke 2001). However, as can be 
expected from human capital theory, workers with flexible contracts participate less often in employer–
funded training. The latter is in line with earlier findings by Albert et al. (2005) who show that workers 
with temporary contracts are less often employed in firms which offer training, and even when they are 
employed in such firms they have a lower probability to participate in training. However, flexible workers 
more often participate in training courses they pay themselves than workers with permanent contracts. 
Whereas only one out of eight workers with a permanent contract who participate in training pay their 
training costs themselves, more than a third of the flexworkers bear the full costs of their training. This is 
likely due to the shorter expected time horizon in which employers have to recoup their training 
investments in flexible workers. The latter particularly holds for those who work on a temporary contract. 
However, Table 1 clearly shows that flexworkers do not manage to fully compensate for the lower 
training provision from their employer by their own training investments. This is an interesting finding 
considering that earlier research (e.g. Booth et al. 2002, De Graaf–Zijl et al. 2010) has merely focused on 
employer–funded training. Obviously, the inadequate compensation for the lack of employer–funded 
training may be due to the uncertainty flexworkers face with respect to the returns on human capital 
investments, as they are uncertain whether they could find a job in which a particular human capital 
investment is productive when their current labour contract terminates. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE> 
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As Table 2 shows, the most important reason to participate in training is to keep up with new skill 
demands. However, this reason holds far less for workers who have a temporary contract and for those 
who are employed by a temporary work agency. Employees with temporary contracts and those who work 
for temporary work agencies participate more often in training with the aim of increasing their 
opportunities to obtain a different job. This suggests that they particularly participate in training – often at 
their own costs (as Table 3 shows) – with the aim to improve their labour market prospects. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 3 shows that employer–funded training is most often firm–specific. For permanent workers, only 
less than one out of five training has a general character.7 However, this share is larger for flexible 
workers: one out of four employer–funded training courses has a general character. This share is even 
larger for workers who have a temporary work agency contract or a temporary contract. Self-funded 
training is by and large general. As can be expected from the human capital model, the participation in 
self-funded training is higher among flexworkers than among workers with a permanent contract.  
 
In the logit analysis reported in the Appendix (Table A.2), we show that conditional on the fact that 
workers receive employer–funded training, those who are employed on a temporary work agency contract 
or a temporary contract are significantly more likely to receive general rather than firm–specific training 
compared to workers with a permanent contract. The fact that employers do pay for general training could 
be due to the fact that the particular mix of different kinds of general training is firm specific (Lazear, 
2009), or that firms want to commit their employees to the firm (Lee and Bruvold 2003). Especially in the 
case of flexible workers, firms might pay the costs of general training because they want to learn about 
workers’ abilities (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998).  
 
<INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE> 
  
Table 4 shows the estimation results of a logit analysis for the probability of participating in training for 
flexworkers compared to those who have a permanent contract. Table 4 also reports the results from a 
multinomial logit model where we distinguish between employer–funded training and self–funded 
training. The table shows that, as expected, training participation is significantly lower for workers with a 
flexible work arrangement. The difference in training participation is especially large for workers on a 
temporary–help agency or temporary contract: compared to permanent workers, their probability of 
training is about 3% lower. However, the estimation results from the multinomial logit model in columns 
2 and 3 show that this only holds for employer–funded training. De Graaf–Zijl et al. (2010) also find that 
                                                          
7 This is calculated as 1.7% / (7.1% +1.7%). 
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flexible workers receive less employer–funded training. Conversely, except for on–call workers, workers 
with flexible contracts have a higher probability of participating in self–funded training. These estimation 
results show that workers with a flexible contract partly compensate for the lack of employer–funded 
training by their own training investments. This also explains why their training usually does not focus on 
the skills they need for their current job but, instead, on the skills they need for applying to another job, as 
shown in Table 2. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE> 
 
5 Training participation and labour mobility 
Table 5 presents descriptive evidence on the relation between workers’ employment contract, training 
participation and various types of labour mobility within a year: losing employment (compared to 
remaining employed), making a transition to a permanent job (compared to making a transition to flexible 
employment), and making a transition to another employer (compared to remaining with the same 
employer).8 The table shows that the correlation between training participation and the loss of 
employment is negative: workers who participated in training are less likely to lose employment than 
those who did not participate in any training course. This is in line with earlier studies for the Netherlands 
which showed that workers who participated in training have a lower probability to become unemployed 
(Fouarge et al. 2009). The relative difference in the risk of losing employment between workers who 
participated in training and those who did not is larger for workers with permanent employment than for 
workers with flexible employment.9 Moreover, the absolute risk of losing employment is larger for 
flexworkers. However, there are considerable differences between workers with different types of flexible 
contracts. For workers with an on–call contract and for those employed by a temporary work agency, the 
negative relation between training participation and the probability to become unemployed is substantial. 
Conversely, for workers on a temporary contract there is virtually no difference in the probability of 
losing employment between those who participated in training and those who did not. 
 
Table 5 also shows that for workers with temporary contracts as well as those employed by temporary 
work agencies, training participation is related to the probability of obtaining permanent employment. For 
both types of flexible workers, the differences in the probability to get a permanent contract between 
trained and untrained workers are large and significant. However, for workers with an on–call contract, 
training participation is hardly related to the probability to get a permanent contract. 
 
                                                          
8 Note that these transitions are not mutually exclusive (e.g. a transition to another employer could coincide with a 
transition to a permanent job). Mutually exclusive labor market transitions of flexible workers are shown in Table 6.  
9 This is due to differences in the composition (such as age) of the groups.  
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There are also substantial differences in job mobility between different types of flexworkers. Those with a 
temporary contract and those who are employed by a temporary work agency change employers more 
often than workers on an on–call contract. However, although flexworkers who participate in training in 
general more often stay with their employer than those who do not train, there are differences according to 
the type of contract. For both workers with a temporary contract and those working for a temporary work 
agency training participation is positively related to the likelihood that they stay with their employer. 
However, workers with on–call contracts who participate in training are more likely to leave their 
employer than those who did not participate in any training course. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE> 
 
Table 6 shows the estimation results of a multinomial logit analysis for the full set of possible labour 
market transitions for workers with flexible contracts.10 In this analysis, we distinguish between (1) the 
probability of remaining employed on a flex contract with the same employer, (2) the probability of 
getting a permanent contract with the same employer, (3) the probability of getting a flex contract in 
another firm, (4) the probability of getting a permanent contract in another firm, and (5) the probability of 
losing employment (i.e. making a transition to unemployment or inactivity). In all analyses, remaining 
employed on a flex contract with the same employer is the reference group.  
 
Table 6 shows that flexworkers who have an on–call contract more often get a permanent contract with 
their employer than temporary work agency workers (the reference group). However, those with an on–
call contract are less likely to switch to a flexible or permanent job in another firm. Moreover, they are 
less likely to lose employment. Temporary contracts are associated to a lower likelihood of changing 
employer (irrespective of the contract type), but employees with such contracts face a higher probability 
of losing employment. 
 
<INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE> 
 
The estimation results confirm that the relation between the training participation of flexworkers and their 
labour market mobility depends on who paid for the training. As expected, flexworkers’ participation in 
employer–funded firm–specific training is positively related to the transition to a permanent contract with 
the current employer, and negatively related to the probability to get a flexible contract with another 
employer and the probability of losing employment. These findings are in line with prior studies by Lynch 
(1993) and Parent (1999), and suggest that firms invest in the firm–specific skills of flexible workers if 
they aim to continue the employment relationship for a longer period. This is consistent with the idea that 
                                                          
10 The analysis excludes workers with a permanent contract. 
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firms use this type of training in the selection process for their flexible workers (Autor 2001). However, 
there is no relation between flexworkers’ participation in employer–funded general training or self–funded 
training and the probability to get a permanent contract with the current employer. Moreover, and contrary 
to our expectations, we do not find a significant correlation between self–funded training of flexworkers 
and the probability to get a permanent contract in another firm.11 This suggests that, for flexworkers, self–
funded training does not contribute to improving their opportunities for obtaining a permanent job.12 
Moreover, the estimation results show a positive correlation between paying for one’s own training and 
the probability of losing employment. This, however, might be due to a selection effect as particularly 
those who run the risk of losing their jobs may try to improve their labour market position by investing in 
further training.  
 
Our analyses suggest that employer–funded firm–specific training contributes to improve the labour 
market position of flexworkers. However, employer–funded general training and self–funded training do 
not help to improve the labour market position of flexworkers. This could be because general training is 
more often not work related13 or because such training is directed to improve the prospects of flexworkers 
with the precarious labour market opportunities. In both cases – which are hard to test empirically – 
human capital theory predicts zero or very low returns. 
 
6 Conclusion14 
Although the differences in training participation have decreased in recent years, the estimation results 
presented in this article confirm the hypothesis from human capital theory that workers with a flexible 
labour contract participate less often in training than those with a permanent contract. This holds for all 
types of flexworkers, although there are considerable differences between the various types of flexible 
work arrangements. The lower training participation of flexworkers is merely due to the fact that these 
workers get less employer–funded training. Workers with a flexible contract partly compensate this lack 
of employer–funded training by their own training investments, which explains why their training does 
not focus on the firm–specific skills they need for their current job but, rather, on the general skills needed 
for finding another job. This being said, conditional on the fact that they do receive employed–funded 
training, flexworkers are more likely than permanent workers to receive general than firm–specific 
training.  
 
                                                          
11 For self-paid training we do not make the distinction between general and firm-specific because it is by and large 
general (see Table 3). 
12 Nevertheless, it could be the case that paying for one’s own training generates a chain in which the temporary 
workers get employer–funded training which increases their opportunities for making a transition to a permanent job. 
However, the existence of such chains cannot be tested with the data at hand. 
13 According to Table 2, about one-third of general training is not work related. 
14 The policy conclusions in this section are the sole responsibility of the first two authors. 
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Furthermore, we analyse to what extent training participation is related to flexible wokers’s labour market 
mobility. We find that for temporary workers, participation in employer–funded firm–specific training is 
related to improved opportunities for a transition to a permanent contract with their employer. This is 
consistent with Autor’s (2001) idea that firms use training in the selection process for their permanent 
staff. However, participation in self–paid training is not related to finding a better job. 
 
The lower training participation of flexworkers is likely to impede workers’ adaptability to changing skill 
demands in the labour market. This suggests that there is indeed a trade–off between labour market 
flexibility and training participation as argued by Arulampalam and Booth (1998). However, this does not 
hold for workers with flexible contracts whose participation in employer–funded firm–specific training 
helps them in making a transition towards a permanent contract with the firm. However, flexworkers who 
do not participate in any employer–funded training cannot adequately compensate this by investing in 
their own skills. This suggests that the market fails in the skills provision of flexible workers which is 
required for giving these workers a more sustainable position in the labour market. From a policy 
perspective, we therefore conclude that if governments want to encourage labour market flexibility, they 
should be aware of the fact that flexible employment contracts impede employee’s human capital 
investments. This could hamper workers’s possibilities to adapt to new skills needs. Increased labour 
market flexibility therefore needs to be supplemented by additional public facilities or labour legislation15 
to stimulate employers to invest in training which enables flexworkers to keep their skills up to date. 
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Table 1: Participation in training and who paid for the training, 2004–2008 (percentages)
  Participation 
in training  Paid by:
1)  
 
% 
   Employer
      % 
Employee 
% 
Permanent employment  11.5 8.9 1.5
Total flexible employment  9.5 4.9 3.3
Temporary work agency employment  9.9 5.0 3.7
Temporary contract  9.6 4.6 3.5
On–call employment  8.9 5.4 2.5
Total  11.3 8.6 1.7
1) excluding training that is neither financed by the employer nor the employee. 
Source: CBS, LFS.     
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Table 2: Main reason for participation in training, 2004–2008 (percentages) 
  
To keep up
 
% 
Compulsory
 
% 
Promotion
 
% 
Another 
job 
% 
Not work 
related 
% 
Permanent employment  40.5  22.7 9.8 16.4 9.7 
Total flexible employment  24.7  21.4 7.0 33.2 11.5 
Temporary work agency 
employment  19.2  22.5  7.5  38.8  10.3 
Temporary contract  23.5  20.9 7.4 32.8 12.4 
On–call employment  37.7  20.3 5.2 23.0 12.2 
Total  39.5  22.6 9.6 17.5 9.8 
Source: CBS, LFS.       
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Table 3: Participation in specific and general training, by employer–funded and self–funded training1) 2004–2008 
(percentages) 
   Employer–funded  Self–funded 
  
Firm–
Specific  General 
Firm–
Specific  General 
Permanent employment  7.1  1.7  0.5  1.0 
Total flexible employment  3.6  1.2  0.9  2.5 
Temporary work agency 
employment  3.6  1.3  0.8  2.9 
Temporary contract  3.3  1.2  0.9  2.5 
On–call employment  4.2  1.1  0.8  1.7 
Total  6.9  1.7  0.5  1.1 
1) excluding training that is neither financed by the employer nor the employee. 
Source: CBS, LFS. 
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Table 4: Probability of training participation 2004–2008 (marginal effects)1) 
Logit (ref: no training)  Multinomial logit (ref: no training) 
                                                    Participation in training  Employer–funded training  Self–funded training 
Permanent employment (ref.) 
Temporary–help agency 
employment    –0.033 ***  –0.049 ***  0.008 *** 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.002)
Temporary contract   –0.031 ***  –0.042 ***  0.004 *** 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.002)
On–call employment   –0.018 **  –0.017 ***  0.000
(0.008) (0.007) (0.002)
Pseudo R–squared                                   0.036 0.038
N                                                   143007 143007          
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in brackets  
1) Control variables: gender, age and age squared, ethnicity (Western, non–Western migrants), educational level, 
occupation, part–time work, job tenure (in log), industry sector, region and time dummies. 
Source: CBS, LFS. 
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Table 5: Participation in training and labour mobility within a year, 2004 – 2008 (percentages) 
 
Losing employment  Permanent job Other employer
after one year1) after one year2) after one year3)
 
Training 
% 
No training 
%    
Training 
% 
No training 
%    
Training 
% 
No training 
%  
Permanent employment 2.4  4.4 98.2 98.1 8.4  7.6
Total flexible employment 15.9  17.4 57.6 48.7 30.6 32.7
Temporary work agency 
employment  14.5  17.2    57.0  43.6    40.1  43.6 
Temporary contract 20.9  21.0 52.4 43.2 30.3 34.4
On–call employment 9.3  11.2 67.1 65.8 13.2 11.5
Total  3.3  5.4 96.1 95.0 9.5  9.3
1) Reference: remaining employed. 
2) Reference: transition to flexible employment after one year. 
3) Reference: remaining with the same employer. 
Source: CBS, LFS. 
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Table 6: Multinomial logit regression for the probability of flexworkers to experience various types of labour market transition, 2004–2008 (marginal effects)1) 
                                                   
Same 
employer/      
Other 
employer/      
Other 
employer/      
Lose 
employment     
permanent 
contract 
    
flexible work 
arrangement
    
permanent 
contract 
         
Temporary work agency employment (ref.) 
Temporary contract                                  –0.012 –0.044 ***  –0.019  **  0.037 ** 
(0.013) (0.008) (0.009)  (0.010)
On–call employment                                  0.251 ***  –0.139 ***  –0.066  ***  –0.028 *** 
(0.014) (0.015) (0.013)  (0.013)
No training (ref.) 
Self–funded training                              –0.013      0.022 0.007       0.057 * 
(0.031) (0.018) (0.020)  (0.021)
Employer–funded general training                  0.031      –0.013      0.004       –0.033     
(0.038) (0.028) (0.027)  (0.035)
Employer–funded firm–specific training                0.064 ***  –0.036 *  0.006       –0.039 *** 
(0.023) (0.021) (0.019)  (0.023)
N                                                   7683                                                              
Pseudo R–squared                                    0.09                                                              
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in brackets  
1) Control variables: gender, age and age squared, ethnicity (Western, non–Western migrants), educational level, occupation, part–time work, job tenure (in log), industry sector, region and 
time dummies. 
Source: CBS, LFS. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1: Summary statistics 
N  Mean  N  Mean 
Type of contract      Industry sector     
Permanent employment  134727 94.2  Agriculture                                         2242  1.6 
Temporary work agency employment  2734  1.9  Industry                                            20293  14.2 
Temporary contract                                  3370  2,4  Construction                                        9074  6.3 
On–call employment                                  2176  1.5  Sales                                               17237  12,1 
Training      Hotel and catering                                  2670  1.9 
No training  127679 89.3  Transport and communication                  9601  6.7 
Self–funded training                              2160  1.5  Finance                                             20709  14.5 
Employer–funded training                  13168  9.2  Government                                          12782  8,9 
Reason for training      Education                                           12322  8.6 
Training: not work related  1566  1.1  Personal and social care                            25654  17.9 
Training: to keep up  6576  4.6  Culture and other services                         4387  3,1 
Training: compulsory  3542  2.5  Other                                               6036  4.2 
Training: promotion  1208  0.8  Firm size     
Training: another job  2454  1.7  Less than 10 employees                             18813  13,3 
Labour market transitions1)      10 to 20 employees                                  15968  11.2 
Same employer/flexible contract  2330  30.3  20 to 50 employees                                  24824  17.4 
Same employer/permanent contract  2326  30.3  50–100 employees                                    19327  13.5 
Other employer/flexible contract  872  11.3  >100 employees  64075  44.8 
Other employer/permanent contract  985  12.8  Occupation     
Lose employment  1170  15.2  General                                             8405  5.9 
Gender      Teaching                                            9878  6.9 
Woman                                               64871  45.4  Agriculture                                         2411  1.7 
Man                                          78136  54.6  Science and engineering                             27108  19.0 
Etnicity      Transport                                           6665  4.7 
Native Dutch background  126737 88.6  (Para)medical                                       12316  8.6 
Foreign background (Western)                 10926  7.6  Language and culture                                1330  0.9 
Foreign background (non Western)          5344  3.7  Behavior en society                                 7613  5.3 
Age                                                     Economics  56049  39.2 
Age                                                 143007 41.7  Personal and social care                            8069  5.6 
Education level      Management                                          3163  2.2 
Primary education                                   5551  3.9  Region     
Lower secondary education                       25123  17.6  North                                               15254  10.7 
Higher secondary education                      64327  45.0  East                                                30718  21.5 
Higher professional education                  32408  22.7  West                                                62216  43.5 
University education                                15598  10.9  South  34819  24.3 
Working hours      Survey year     
Part–time worker                                    45231  31.6  2004  29777  20.8 
Full–time worker  97776  68.4  2005  30774  21.5 
Tenure      2006  27892  19.5 
Tenure (months)  143007 131.4  2007  26666  18.6 
      2008  27898  19.5 
1) Only for flexworkers. 
Source: CBS, LFS. 
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Table A.2: Logit model for the probability that employer–funded training is general, 2004–2008 (marginal effects)1) 
                                                   
General training 
(ref: firm–specific training) 
    
Permanent employment (ref.) 
Temporary–help agency employment                   0.078 *** 
(0.027)
Temporary contract                                  0.065 **  
(0.026)
On–call employment                                  0.000     
(0.034)
Pseudo R–squared                                    0.031     
N                                                   13116
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 
Standard errors in brackets  
1) Control variables: gender, age and age squared, ethnicity (Western, non–Western migrants), educational level, 
occupation, part–time work, job tenure (in log), industry sector, region and time dummies. 
Source: CBS, LFS. 
 
 
 
